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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
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KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK and
CINDY STEWART,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH
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BART MULSTROM, JOHN HARPER,
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SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Civil No. 980600126

)

COMES NOW Don S. Redd, Attorney for and in behalf of Plaintiffs, Kaziah May Hancock
(hereinafter "Ms. Hancock") and Cmdy Stewart (hereinafter "Ms. Stewart") and Complains and
alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

(a)

That plaintiffs are individuals residing in Sanpete County, State of Utah.

(b)

Defendant "The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of the Saints of the

Last Days is an unincorporated entity headquartered in Sanpete County, State of Utah.
(c)

Defendant James D. Harmston ("Mr. Harmston") is an individual residing in
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Sanpete County, State of Utah.
(d)

Defendant William B. Lithgow is an individual who was residing in Sanpete

County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action.
(e)

Defendant Keith Larson is an individual residing in Sanpete County, State of

(f)

Defendant Daniel Simmons is an individual residing in Sanpete County,

(g)

Defendant Kay Crabtree is an individual who was residing in Sanpete

Utah.

State of Utah.

County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action.
(h)

Defendant Jeff Hanks is an individual who was residing in Sanpete County,

State of Utah at the time of these causes of action.
2.

James D. Harmston is the founder and ultimate leader of the True and Living

Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days, (hereinafter "the TLC")
3.

Mr. Harmston is also the head of an organization referred to as "The Church of the

Firstborn."
4.

On or about November of 1993 Ms. Hancock became affiliated with the True and

Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days.
5.

On or about April 11, 1995 Ms. Stewart became affiliated with the True and Living

Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF CONTRACT -- all defendants)
6.

In support of her First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation

contained in paragraphs #1 through #5 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
7.

After becoming affiliated with the TLC the Plaintiffs were induced by Mr.

Harmston and his religious subordinates to liquidate their assets and place them into the control of
the Defendants.
8.

On or about March 25, 1996 the Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, met with the
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"Bishopric" of the TLC, Keith Larson, Kay Crabtree, and Kent Braddy, to establish a stewardship
for her in exchange for her contribution of money and time to the TLC.
9.

In exchange for money, goods, and services to be given by the Plaintiff, Kaziah May

Hancock, to the Defendants the Plaintiff was assured and promised by the TLC and/or its
representatives that she would receive back a "slewardship" of .property and support in exchange for
the funds she "consecrated" to the TLC.
10.

As a further inducement for the Plaintiff to "consecrate" her wealth over to the

Defendants, Plaintiff was promised by Mr. Harmston that they would become members of The
Church of the Firstborn and would meet Christ face to face.
Cindy Stewart liquidated her entire retirement savings at the insistence of Mr.
Harmston and turned all the funds over to him for the use of the TLC.
Harmston and other acting as TLC officers promised Cindy Stewart full repayment
of her money plus payment of all her costs and losses for early withdrawal of her retirement funds.
11.

Kaziah May Hancock did deliver money, goods and services to the Defendants after

this time and continued to do so until Ms. Stewart was excommunicated in or about May 1997 and
Ms. Hancock was asked to leave in or about August 1997.
12.

Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never received a "stewardship" of any kind as

promised.
13.

Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never met Christ face to face as promised.

14.

Plaintiff, Cindy Stewart was never repaid her retirement or the costs and penalties

she incurred for the early withdrawal.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION - all defendants)
15.

In support of their Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every

allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #14 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
16.

By appealing to the Plaintiffs deepest spiritual needs and commitments, Mr.
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Harmston, along with other Defendants, persuaded the Plaintiffs that Mr. Harmston was the sole
spokesman on earth for God and thus gained the confidence of the Plaintiffs.
17.

After gaining a superior position of confidence with the Plaintiffs, Mr. Harmston

and other Defendants took unfair advantage of that position by persuading the Plaintiffs that they
must turn over their wealth to the Defendants.
18.

Promises were made by many of the Defendants, including Mr. Harmston, acting in

his own person and as an agent of the TLC to Ms. Hancock that if she sold her ranch in Indianola
and consecrated her assets to the TLC, she would receive back a "stewardships" ,or~a~place where
she could continue to raise her animals.
19.

Promises were made by Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of

the TLC, to Ms. Stewart that if she liquidated her ERA account and consecrate the monies from the
account to him he would repay her and pay any tax liability she would incur for early withdrawal.
20.

Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of the TLC, also promised

Ms. Stewart that she shouldn't be concerned about giving up her ERA account because he and/or the
TLC would always take care of her.
21.

Mr. Harmston, along with other officers of the TLC:
(i)

made representations to the Plaintiffs promising future performance;

(ii)

the statements of future performance was false;

(iii)

the false statements of future performance was material;

(iv)

the Defendants either knew that the statements of future performance

made to the Plaintiffs were false or were ignorant of their truth;
(v)

the Defendants intended that the Plaintiffs would act upon the false

statements and in the manner reasonably contemplated;
(vi)

the Plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the statements of future

performance made to them by the Defendants;
(vii)

the Plaintiffs relied on the false statements of future performance made to

them by the Defendants;
(viii)

The Plaintiffs had a right to rely on the statements of future performance

to be true;
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(ix)

The Plaintiffs turned over their property and means to Mr. Harmston and/or

the TLC and consequently suffered the loss and conversion of nearly all their assets.
22.

Plaintiffs allege that the above actions were intentional on the part of Mr. Harmston

acting in his own person and/or as an agent of the TLC, and some of the Defendants, and constitute
actual fraud; or the above actions were unintentional on the part of the Defendants and constitute
constructive fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation.
23.

Failure to perform on a future promise constitutes a false statement under the

circumstances required by law and/or equity as follows:
(i)

the promisor(s) had a pecuniary interest in the transaction; [Galloway v.
AFCO Development Corp. 777 P.2d 506 (Utah App 1989)].

(ii)

the promisor(s) had control over whether or not the promise was fulfilled;
["Statements ... relating to future events may be actionable ... where the
future event is full within the declarant's control." 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud);
also Logan Equipment Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F.Supp. 1188.
"Generally, redress may be had ... for an unfulfilled promise to perform in
the future made with the undisclosed intention not to perform, or without
the intention to perform, and for the purpose of inducing action." 37 C.J.S.
15 (Fraud)].

(iii)

the promise has a fiduciary, confidential, or superior relationship with the
promisee;
["Where a relation of trust and confidence exists between two parties, so
that one of them places peculiar reliance in the other's trustworthiness, the
latter is liable for representations as to future conduct, and not merely as to
past facts." 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud); also Southern Mortg. Co. v. O'Dom,
699 F.Supp 1227; Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P .2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34;
Edmunds v. Valley Circle Estates, 2 Dist., 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 16 C.A. 4
1290].

Plaintiff alleges that some or all three of the above exceptions existed in their relationships and
dealings with the Defendants.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(FRAUDULENT CONVERSION or in the alternative UNJUST
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT » all defendants)
24.

In support of their Third Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every

allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #23 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
25.

Defendants have acquired about two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00)

of money, services, or property from Ms. Hancock, and fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six
dollars ($15,766.00) from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion and/or unjust enrichment. The bulk
of Ms. Stewart's money represented a retirement account awarded her in a divorce settlement and
constituted nearly all of her assets.
26.

Defendants have breached an implied contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to provide

valuable consideration, as promised, in the full amount of money, services, or property taken by the
Defendants.
27.

By receiving or taking money, services, or property from Plaintiffs without

providing equal value in return, Defendant's have been unjustly enriched to Plaintiffs detriment.
28.

As a result of Defendants unjust enrichment, Ms. Hancock have been damaged in

the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00); and Ms. Stewart has been
damaged in the amount of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00), plus prejudgment interest accruing since the time of the conversion of their money as permitted by Utah
Code Annotated 1953 (hereinafter "U.C.A.")15-1-1(2).
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(RACKETEERING -- all defendants)
29.

In support of their Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-alleges each and every

allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #28 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
30.

Plaintiffs allege that the TLC qualifies as a racketeering enterprise under the Utah

Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-10-1601 et. seq.
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Defendants

affiliated with the TLC have committed at least three acts in violation of the "Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act." Defendants violations are stated in particularity as follows:
(a)

James D. Harmston and each other Defendant in conjunction with

their leadership positions in the TLC and "The Church of the Firstborn", has
violated the Utah Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-101601 et. seq. They have engaged in unlawful activity. Some of these unlawful activities are
including, but not limited to: Theft by Deception, U.C.A. 76-6-405; Theft of Services,
U.C.A. 76-6-409; Unlawful Dealing with Property by Fiduciary, U.C.A. 76-6-513;
Communications Fraud, U.C.A. 76-10-1801, either directly or did aid and abet other
Defendant's by some or all of the above actions.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
HARM - all defendants)
31.

In support of their Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every

allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #30 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
32.

Plaintiffs have suffered great mental anguish and pain as a result of the loss from

their life savings effected by the conversion their money by the Defendants.
33.

The actions of the Defendants named in this Complaint have significantly harmed

and damaged the Plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants individually and
severally and in their favor as follows:
1.

An award of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) representing the

actual value of money, goods, and services fraudulently converted from Ms. Hancock to the
Defendant's use; and an award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00)
representing the actual value of money received from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion.
2.

An award of interest accruing at ten percent per annum on the amount of money

converted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant's use as allowed by Utah Code Annotated 15-1-1
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since the date of the conversion.
3.

An award of damages as allowed as a civil penalty by Utah's "Pattern of Unlawful

Activity Act," Utah Code Annotated 76-10-1605 et. seq. equal to double the total amount of
Plaintiffs actual damages in the loss of their principle plus accrued interest, and costs of litigation
including reasonable attorney fees.
4.

An award of punitive damages as allowed by, and in keeping with, Utah Code

Annotated 78-18-1 et. seq. in the amount of treble the total amount of Plaintiffs actual damages in
the loss of their principle plus accrued interest.
5.

An award of two hundred fifty thousand ($250,000.00) for the mental anguish

suffered by Cindy Stewart and Ms. Hancock which represents the amount of the funds taken from
her; and as award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00) for the mental
anguish suffered by Ms. Stewart which represents the amount of the funds taken from her.
6.

An award of attorney's fees and costs.

7.

And such other relief as the court deems appropriate.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMnTED this _ / 2 day of February 2003.

DON S. REDD, Attorney for Plaintiffs,
44 North Main
Layton, Utah 84041

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was
mailed on the [ A day of February 2003 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail to the following:
John H. Jacobs
Attorney for Crabtree
75 N. Center St.
American Fork, UT 84003
F. Kevin Bond
Budge W. Call
Mark S. Middlemas
Attorneys for Defendants
311 S. State Suite 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Keith Larson
111 West Center
Snowflake, AZ 85937
Clark R. Nielsen
Attorney at Law
68 S. Main St., Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
William Lithgow
37550 Pine Knoll Ave
Palm Desert, CA 92211

Secretary
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F. Kevin Bond (5039)
Budge W. Call (5047)
Attorneys for Defendants
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8900
Facsimile: (801) 521-9700
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAZIAHMAYHA..O
CINDY STEWART,

: d

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
12(b)(6) and 9(b) U.R.C.P.

Plaintiffs,
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHUKOF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS
OF THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D.
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B.
LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON,
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY
CRABTREE, KENT BRADDY,
JEFF HANKS, BART MUSTROM,
JOHN HARPER and JOHN DOES
NOS. 1 *.

Civil No. 980600126
Judge David L. Mower

Defendants.

ij)Mi-. .\ '''• , .;.e Defendants, ;i.v. :;LL. ^.:^, , ,.... ^;;ui\_;; „: j ; . . ^ •..:.;..,; J :
Saints of the Last Days (hereinafter "TLC"), James D. Harmston, Daniel Simmons, Kent Braddy,
Bart Mulstrom, and John Harper and hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT CANNOT ADJUDICATE CHURCH DOCTRINE.
The alleged promises that Hancock would be a member of the Church of the First

Born, would see Christ face to face, and at some point would receive a "stewardship"of property
from the Lord; all deal with Church doctrine, not subject to adjudication by the Court.
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof. These two clauses known as the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, limit government activity in religious doctrine.
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971).
It is well settled in the federal courts and in the State of Utah, that the Establishment
Clause prohibits judicial review and interpretation of church law, policies, or practices; and the
determination of these claims is barred by the First Amendment. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints, 21.P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzmam 403 U.S. 602 (1971); and
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral 344 U.S. 94, 97 (1952) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court states:
"churches must have power to decide for themselves, free from state interference matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Id. at 116.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lafferty states
Men may believe what they cannot prove. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some maybe incomprehensible to others. Similarly due process considerations
[under both the state and federal constitutions] bar courts from requiring defendants
to prove the truth of their religious beliefs because they would have to prove the
unprovable, an obvious unfairness of the most fundamental kind. State v. Lafferty,
749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1988).

2

Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract claim deals \\ ith chi irch doctrine such as consecration,
obedience and faith. Things that Church members believe which cannot be proven. The Court cannot
adjudicate these issues. Nut only would Midi litigation he in violation ol the 1 list Aiuendinenl, but
it would have a drastic chilling effect, prohibiting all churches from accepting charitable contributions
based upon their inability to prove their doctrine and beliefs in a court of law.
T]--- '"iv

":> '

I lefts v. Mu;;os. •-

l

.' .

. - -i; -vi.V •

.>

adjudication of church doctrine. Jeffs v. Stubbs involved a property dispute over certain land
possessed by the claimants. I here was no question c f cl lurch doctrine :: entral to the case, but issues.
of real property law, i.e. w hether the occupants had a life estate or were tenants at will. I lowever,
facts alleged in this case "consecrating" money to see,Christ face to face, to be a member of the
Church of the Firstborn, an :! t : receh;re a ste\* ardship ft 0111 the I ord. , do i lecessarily im;rolve issi les
of church government, faith and doctrine.
If Hancock v» *;;L^ . ; •.

::• .1 f u - • - ; ! pci * .

•• i '..:*...* .

-.A :,d\-.i

negotiated a price, and had the necessary deeds prepared, signed and recorded. The Court then
would have been able to enforce the written contract according to its terms without interfering or
(•:-•.in/ling it .ch ir ^;r:-u /

:'* .

* - - . Jelts v. Stubbs " ••' :

• < m-\ t • i-,--h. <'\^--:

from doing this simply because a religious entity was involved.
I lowever, in this case the claim is tl mt moi iej vv as donated or "consecrated" to the
Church and that verbal promises were made regarding membership in the Church of the Firstborn,
seeing Christ face to face, and receiving a "stewardship" of property from the Lord. There are no
leizal * : ° ' •

:

k" ••! i^ui 1 ^ I'm ifh (

twined w i t h Church doctrine.
3

,

!

• ••

,

H.

THE ALLEGED PROMISES ARE TOO ILLUSORY TO ENFORCE.
The promises allegedly made, even if not religious in nature, are so illusory that they

still cannot be enforced. To be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see Christ face to face,
and to receive a "stewardship" of property from the Lord; are all too indefinite to be enforced. In
fact, the Plaintiff, may still receive all of these blessings at some point, if she remains faithful. A
supposed promise is illusory when it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced with any certainty.
Resource Management v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). See ako Wharf Restaurant
Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.App. 1979) (when its provisions are such as to make its
performance entirely discretionary on the part of the alleged promisor, the promise is illusory and
cannot be enforced); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc. 665 P.2d 414 (Wash.App. 1983) (promise is illusory
when it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced); Lane v. Wahl 6 Pod 621 (Wash.App. 2000) (an
"illusory promise" is one that is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced, or by its terms, makes
performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor). The alleged promises in
this case, to be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see Christ face to face, and to receive
a "stewardship" of property, are so indefinite and discretionary that they are illusory and
unenforceable. Id.
m.

ANY PROMISE TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY OR SUPPORT
FOR LIFE IS INVALID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Plaintiffs have alleged an oral promise to receive a "stewardship''of property.

There is no writing to bind the Defendants to a contract to convey, or provide any interest in, real
property. Under Utah law, the Statute of Frauds requires that a contract for the sale of, or for any
interest in, real property exceeding a year, must be in writing. §25-5-1 U.C. A. Stangl v. Ernst

4

Home Center; Inc. 943 P 2d 356 (I It \,pp 199 7) (agreemei it to ei ltei into real estate lease for
period longer than one year is within Statute of Frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable);
Martin v. Allbritton, ao_ ; _..

J

'..-.•.,

.

VIAVJL*

lid; .i.i.u .i> u ^ c ,<

AD*

providing for such an interest in property, therefore this claim must fail as a matter of law.
The Statute of Frauds further provides that any agreement that by its terms is not
to bv perfpr'*:"<• ^ 'f:

•*••

;

•• '•

:* :

>•' iln'.'ij'rtTn^"

u:i; -ile^ ruc nr reement

is in writing, signed by the party to be charged. §25-56-4 LLC. A. Therefore, any alleged verbal
promise made to Hancock that in return lor I in doiKilious the ( 'In in I i would laic care ul" Iiei for
the rest of her life, or provide support to her for the rest of her life, is also void and unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds. Id.
p

-^f! "c^*- n: lai ice ha s not been a lleged in this •• ^ - p- •

:n it b< v~r--~:e there was

no delivery of real property. Binninger v. Hutchison, 355 So.2d M J (Fla.App. 1978) (before
partial performance exception to tl le statute of ft audsi nay be applied. deli v ei ;; of possessioi in lust
be made pursuant to the terms of the contract); Robertson v. Melton, 115 SW.2d 624 (possession
by the purchaser of realty is an indispensable element of part performance); Leverettv. Leverett,

of consideration and the making of valuable improvements). Hancock did not take possession of,
or make any improvements, u; .... :^.. . . ,._• y.
Furthermore, part performance of an oral contract not to be performed within a
year, does not take it out of the Statute of Frauds. Trethewey v. Bancroft-Whitney Co. 534 P.2d
1382 (Wash Aji|i

l r| -,ku I fin dm hiii** of piiil prrfnrmnmr dors iiui .ipph, M \hv rlnuse of the

statute of frauds declaring void every oral contract not to be performed within one year, such
5

application would in effect repeal this clause of the statute); Manning v. Woods. Inc., 357 P.2d
757 (Kan. 1960) (a parol contract not to be performed within a year, is not enforceable or taken
out of the statute by part performance). Therefore, any oral agreement or promise to provide
support for the rest of Hancock's life, is void and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Finally, the Plaintiffs cannot seek liability against the other Defendants, who were not
a party to the alleged promises. The Statute of Frauds requires a writing before any party is required
to answer for the debt of another. Automotive Mfgrs. Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts. Inc.,
596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979) § 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. Without the necessary writing signed by each
Defendant, such a claim is unenforceable as a matter of law. Commodore Home Systems Inc. v.
Citicorp., 780 P.2d 674 (Okl. 1989)
IV.

ALLEGATIONS OF ERAUD HAVE NOT BEEN MADE
WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY UNDER RULE 9(b).
Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. requires that allegations of fraud be plead with sufficient

particularity. The Plaintiffs have made reference to one Bishopric Meeting where promises were
allegedly made with only three Defendants present. However, the Plaintiffs have included all of
the Defendants in their Fraud claim, claiming that they also persuaded them. This is insufficient
to establish a meritorious claim.
Under Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. the Plaintiffs must set forth the circumstances
constituting the fraud as to each individual Defendant, i.e, what representations were made by
whom, and at what time. This is particularly important in this case, since the Utah Liability
Reform Act, abolishing joint and several liability, requires an apportionment of fault as to each

6

Defendant, or other potentially liable parties. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Parker; 936 P.2d
1088 (Ut.App. 1997).
Fi irti lern lore. tlrisCoin tl: lasali ead) foi n id tl lattl le ii if : i matioi lpi CT\ idedii I this case
was insufficient as to each of the individual Defendants to enter a judgment. Use of the terms
"fraud"and "conspiracy" and "negligence" in the complaint, constitutes general accusations in
,]]C f , ;rm 0 f conclusions, without setting forth the basic facts sufficient to constitute the fraud, and
will not stand up to a motion to dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962).
\

THERE IS NO CLAIM IN UTAH FOR CLERICAL
MALPRACTICE FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DIJTY
Rule 9(b) would also apply to Plaintiffs' Constructive Fraud claim. Furthermore,

there Ldii.*

^

:

.
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.*-\a:d ictujiu^ a lnJm. uuy

relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). The Utah Courts have refused
to establish a fiduciary relationship between religious leaders and their members, L o determine
tU'tn'.e*-;-, ; ]: :i v -

.. -. -

v 1 ••! v i ' ^ n l d e n t ,

::-".-.'"• h 1 - '
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minister or other cleric in the state, would require the courts to evaluate and investigate religious

of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Franco v. L.D.S. Church, 21 P,3d 198 at
206 (Utah 2001). See also White v. Blackburn, 7h, J\^u 4_. A... ,_
i

^ --Vr

>s^>* -^orcilie

-* diTliiuvi to establish a cause of action for clerical malpractice.
\ I.

THE CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
IS NOT RECOGNIZED FOR FUTURE PROMISES.
T!"- " "' •''" vgligeni inisrqire^!i»aiirTi appii

>•

: u r r i li;^ he- •• - <r > ^irrr.t

misrepresentation of an existing fact. High Country Movin\ Inc. v. U.S. West Direct Co., 839
7

P.2d 469 (Colo. App. 1992) (a claim of negligent misrepresentation cannot be based solely on a
claim of nonperformance of a promise to do something in the future). The Plaintiffs have not
alleged the misrepresentation of any existing material fact, but have claimed that statements made
concerning some future performance were false. Since the Plaintiffs have failed to allege the
negligent misrepresentation of an existing material fact, this claim should be dismissed. IdVH.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
FOR FRAUDULENT CONVERSION.
Conversion is a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal

property, without lawful justification. The elements for conversion are: (1) plaintiffs ownership
or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; and (2) defendant's conversion
by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff s property rights; and (3) damages. Therefore, there
can be no cause for the conversion money.
Plaintiffs in this case have alleged that money was consecrated to the Church in
return for certain promises, i.e., being a member of the Church of the Firstborn, seeing Christ
face to face and receiving a stewardship of property to raise goats. The Plaintiffs have not alleged
that the Defendants obtained any personal property of the Plaintiffs by any wrongful act, but that
the property was freely given.
Moreover, conversion applies to the wrongful possession of tangible personal
property, not for the return of money, or damages on a cause of action. The Plaintiffs have not
been deprived of ownership of personal property. Allied Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, 731 A.2d 957
(Md. 1999). (conversion applies to rights in specific tangible property not for the return of

8

money). It is not alleged that the Defendants exerted any wrongful dominion over the Plaintiffs
tangible property by a wrongful act, therefore, this claim should be dismissed.
l

Jt-JuAINTIFFS HAVE ALLEGED A VERBAL CONTRACT; Til I ] S
THERE CAN BE NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a verbal contract and have elected to sue for

breach oi "tl lat coi ltract ' rherefore, Pla intiffs' cla in 1 foi i n i ji ist ei n icl in lent si 101 lid be disn lissed.
Recovery under unjust enrichment is available only when no contract exists. Wood v. Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co., . . \

-

App. 2001)

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have admitted that the property was freely given or
consecrated to the Church in exchange for certain promises. The fact the Plaintiffs voluntarily
gave this n ic-iiey, \\\\\\ \\\\\ liidr. llini J.iim I i im|iist em ' x* .

...viich v. Deasoness Medical

Center, 776 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1989) (to establish unjust enrichment, plaintiff cannot be a
volunteer).
IX.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE A CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
In order to state a claim for Intentional Infliction oi Lmotional Distress the party

rr.-^' .lll'.w-' *

'

J

r.1 '

M ••* (•; i s a * : » ;
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against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (2) the offending party intended
to cause, oi: acted ii I r eckless disregai d of tl: :«:: probability of causii ig? emotioi lal distress; (3) the
plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) defendants' actions was an actual and
proximate cause of the emotional distress. White v. Blackburn, <* i .~u i. ^ , i. . , u i.App.
1990); Retherford v. A1' dv 1" Communications of the Mountain Sia.-.-s, .L,
971 (Utah 1992.)

^ — P '"d 04^ (•"' i-

Plaintiffs have failed to properly allege these four necessary elements. Plaintiffs
simply allege that they have suffered great mental anguish from losing money as a result of the
Defendants' alleged failure to keep their promises. The loss of money, or breach of contract
alone, is not sufficient to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege what conduct by each individual
Defendant, was so outrageous and intolerable; and how the conduct of each Defendant was the
direct cause of any severe emotional distress. Without specific facts, it is impossible to determine
whether or not any of the Defendants acted outrageously or intolerable or was the cause of
Plaintiffs' harm.
X.

SINCE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE ANY
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS
THE RICO CLAIM SHOULD ALSO BE DISMISSED.
The Plaintiffs' RICO claim should also be dismissed. As set forth above, the

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any unlawful activity on the part of the Defendants, or any unlawful
activity that would fall under the RICO statute.
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to constitute Theft by Deception or Theft of
Service under Utah's statutes.

Plaintiffs have also failed to allege any facts constituting

Communications Fraud or the Unlawful Dealing with Property by a Fiduciary. Plaintiffs have
merely cited the statutory reference for these claims. They have not alleged any facts to support
these claims.
Merely citing statutes in conclusory form, without facts to substantiate the substance
of the allegation, is not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v.
Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1970) (motion to dismiss should have been granted where complaint
10

alleged defendants conspired to harass, annoy, threaten and intimidate plaintiff, but gave no notice
of nature or substance of alleged acts, and did not mention causation between acts and alleged
effects); W illiams v. Maie 1-arn 1 ^._ ^ . . ' *'

,-

V

;
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conclusion is not sufficient; the pleading must set forth the nature or substance of the acts
COmpiaina

The Plaintiffs cannot simply allege that the Defendant violated a statute and cite the
statute they must set forth the nature and substance of the facts constituting the violation Id. The
R ICO claii i 1 fa ils to do tl lis. a i id si 101 ilci be ciisi i lissed
CONCLUSION
Pl.iirui:"'

jati act claii n cai n lot be adjudicated as it ii :n ol\ es Church

doctrine; is illusory, and ii; violation of the Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1 et. seg. U.C.A.,
Therefore it fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' Fraud claim fails to set forth the facts and

named Defendant, as required under Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. This claim should be dismissed.
Negligent .\ii l e p e r s - ,

' A o u . / a .;-•

. n. .:ui-. L.

)

be performed in the future, as alleged in this case. This claim should be dismissed. The State of
Utah also does not recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. Constructive Fraud, against
clerical ministers, as si id i a findli ig w 01 ild 1 eqi lire the ecu irts to establisl 1. 01 favor. one religion
over another, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. This claim cannot stand.

spiritual reasons, i.e. being a member of the Church of the Firstborn and seeing Christ face to
face. There is no allegation of any specific personal property that was converted; and based on

the Plaintiffs' own allegations, the Defendants did not obtain their donations through any unlawful
means, as required for conversion. The Plaintiffs seeking a return of their money does not state
a claim for conversion.
Plaintiffs' claim for Unjust Enrichment also fails based on the pleadings, as
Plaintiffs have alleged that they freely "consecrated" their money based on an alleged verbal
contract. Plaintiffs have elected to sue under this alleged contract. Plaintiffs cannot allege the
existence of a contract and that they voluntarily gave money to the Church and maintain their
claim for Unjust Enrichment.
Plaintiffs' RICO claim fails, as a matter of law, for the reasons stated above.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege any type of wrongful act on the part
of the Defendants, or unlawful activity, that would fall under the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Act" (RICO) statutes.
Plaintiffs' claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress also fails. Plaintiffs
have failed to allege the proper elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs
claim that losing their money caused them great mental anguish, alone is insufficient to state a
claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Based on the foregoing all of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed.
DATED this /ZL day of March 2003.

^^fr****** C^'£^*^X_ ,
B&f&fo. Call
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify on the

day of March, 2003, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Don S. Redd
Attorney for Kaziah May Hancock
and Cindy Stewart
Attorney for Plaintiffs
44 North Main
Lay ton. UT 84041
Clark R. Nielson
68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Daniel Simmons
True and Living Church of Jesus Christ
of Saints of the Last Days
37 South Main
Manti, Utah 84642
John H. Jacobs
JACOBS & EDDY, P.C
Attorney for Kay Crabtree
75 North Center Street
American Fork, UT 84003
William Lithgow
37550 Pine Knoll Ave.
Palm Desert, CA 92211
Keith Larson
111 Center
Snowflake AR 85937
Phillip P. Savage
340 West 400 South
Manti, Utah 84642
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DISTRgCffiff^^

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^ordtdiM

Plaintiff,

*
*

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

it

vs.

Kd^iaA

AOM) rtrrrda^t

T
Defendant,

C a s e No,

Judge

q^kOOOOZ

Lou/3 A

Wim

STATE OF UTAH, Dept of
Human Services
Intervenor.

[ ] The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on
before the Honorable

. The

Plaintiff appeared in person.

[ ] The above-entitled matter came on before ine court on
Plaintiff's Affidavit for Entry of Divorce Decree in
accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administrations

[ ]The Defendant was regularly served but failed to appear in
person or otherwise file responsive pleadings and the Court
therefore enters the Defendant's default.

[ ]The Court issued an Order for Publication of Summons and said
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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\~f

Summons was published in the

,

a newspaper of general circulation in the above-entitled
county once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks from
to

inclusive.

The Clerk of Court

mailed a true and correct: copy of the Summons and Complaint to
the Defendant at his last known address and duly executed an
Affidavit of Mailing certifying said mailing.

[ ]The Defendant appeared in person and was represented by

[ ]More than ninety days has passed since this matter was filed
with the Court or the parties have completed the Divorce
Education Course.

The Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and being otherwise fully advised, it is
hereby,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of

Divorce from the Defendant, such to become final upon signature
and entry herein.

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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2.

That there have been 0 children born as issue of this

marriage to wit:

=

=

If

-"

— •

—

,1

CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE
NAME

[ ]

DATE OF BIRTH

3.

That the [ JPlaintiff

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

[ jDefendant is a fit and proper

person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the
minor children of the parties, subject to the [ JPlaintiff1 s

[

jDefendant's right to visit with the children at reasonable times
and places.

[ ]

3.

That both parents be awarded the joint legal custody of

the minor children, but that the [ JPlaintiff

[ JDefendant be

awarded the primary physical custody of the children, subject to the
other party's right to visit with the children at reasonable times
and places-

[J

3.

That each parent be awarded the permanent care, custody,

and control of the minor children as specified below, subject to the

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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non-custodial parent's right to visit with the children at
reasonable times and places.

[ ]

3.

That both parties be awarded the joint legal custody of

the minor children, but that the primary physical custody of the
children be given to each parent as specified below, subject to the
non-custodial parent's right to visit with the children at
reasonable times and places.

1 CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE
NAME

4.
the

CUSTODIAN

That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et sea. (1953 as amendpH;^

[ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant

]Plaintiff [ JDefendant

a.

be ordered to pay to the [

as and for child support:

A sum of not less than $

per month as base

support for the minor children of the parties, pursuant to the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children become 18 years
of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.

QC V e r .
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b.

naT affile^

The base child support award should be reduced by 50%

for each minor child for time periods during which such minor child
is with the non-custodial parent by order for at least 25 of any 30
consecutive days.

If the dependent child is a recipient of Aid to

Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the p-rtlca I^r
reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be
approved by the Office of Recovery Services.

However, normal

visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be
considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement.

c.

The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to

mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 parts
4 and 5 (1953 as amended), and any Federal and State tax refunds or
rebates due the Defendant may be intercepted by the State of Utah
and applied to existing child support arrearages.

This income

withholding procedure should apply to existing and future payors.
All withheld income should be submitted to the Office of Recovery
Services until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child
support to the Plaintiff.

d.

The issue of child support arrearages may be determined

by further judicial or administrative process.

e.

Each of the parties should be under mutual obligation to

notify the other within ten (10) days of any change in monthly
income -

QC Ver. 12-17-95

Page 5 of 14

HRPPPr

r\v

r\T\rr>nrx?

5.

That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (1953) as amended:

a.

Both parties should be required to maintain insurance

for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children where
available at reasonable cost.

b.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs

of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion
of the insurance.

c.

Both parties should share equally all reasonable and

necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and
co-payments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by
the parties.

d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide

written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to
the other parent within 30 days of payment.

e.

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the

right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with
the Subparagraph "d" above.

6.

That pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both

parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career
or occupational training for child care expenses of the custodial
parent.
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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a.

The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her

share of child care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon
presentation of proof of the child care expense.

b.

The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide

written verification of the cost and identity of a child care
provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider
and thereafter on the request of the other parent.

The parent shall

notify the other parent of any change of a child care provider or
the monthly expense of child care within 30* calendar days of the
date of the change.

A parent incurring child care expenses may be

denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover
the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the
expenses fails to comply with these provisions.

[ ]

7,

That each party be ordered to assume and pay the

following:

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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The Plaintiff:
Obligation

Amount

5
$v\lpyttv\ LLLwJoel^ttfvwe. o ^ e .
I l^j^unt s
wnl^^

s

r

\%A
ZS7.a\

$
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5

#f. 7 J

$

1

$

The Defendant:
Obligation

Amount

||Azi*L <TK. ini&A-

4}art-*?!)

fatuf^fw- v rdjmir

$

/SD-&}\pLO

%
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s
II

$
$

s
s
$

c.

All remaining debts and obligations should be the

responsibility of the paxty who incurred the particular debt.

[ ] 8.

That personal property of the parties should be

distributed as follows:

QC V e r .
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a.

To t h e P l a i n t i f f :

fnw JViW&r , 7 LtfVS<£J&

To the Defendant

(tilOMIWJZJS e^t&pf'

'c.

All remaining personal property should be awarded to

-each of the parties as they have heretofore divided i t .

[V]

9.

That during the course of the marriage, the parties

acquired certain real property to wit:

r

1

a.

XflM

A none - . ^ o

CU.

C U.

<{tl So-

. AuJl- //A.

more particularly described by the following legal
description:

Lot J. Sleds Z7. P/tfA"

JV)

b.

practicable
QC V e r .
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Such p r o p e r t y s h o u l d o e sold, a s soon a s r e a s o n a b l y and t h e p r o c e e d s of

12-17-95
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i.

FIrst# to pay expenses of sale;

ii.

Second, to retire any and all
mortgages and liens;

iii. Third, to pay all marital debts
and obligations;
iv.

Last, the balance remaining
thereafter to be divided equally
between the parties.

[ ]

b.

That the [ JPlaintiff ^ D e f e n d a n t be awarded the home

and real property as

[ ]Plaintiff's [W]Defendant's sole and

exclusive property.

[ ]

b.

That the [ JPlaintiff [V]Defendant should be awarded the

exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the
occurrence of the first of the following conditions:

i.

The youngest child of the parties reaches
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/

ii . The party remarries;
iii. The party ceases to use the home as the
primary residence;
iv.

The partly cohabits with a non-relative
adult of the opposite sex in the home.

[ ]

c.

Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions

enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of
^""crz^ __ W.^;D uiauucr in said norae as determined by an appraisal
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from
the appraised value the amount of all encumbrances.

The Plaintiff

should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of
the entry of the Decree in this matter.

[ ]

d.

A home located at:

3.1% U): 4& <£p.

, /fab.

(Jjf.§

more p a r t i c u l a r l y described by the following l e g a l
description:

4r^

( ]

a.

bi**^£7. T/^T

U

A " /4AA/r/ d/rv SURVEY} Sa^^P:

Such property should be jold as soon cs reasonably

practicable and the proceeds of

the sale applied as follows:

i.

First, to pay expenses of sale;

ii.

Second, to retire any and all
mortgages and liens;

n i . Third, to pay ai* marital debts
and obligations;
iv.

Last, the balance remaining
thereafter to be divided equally
between the parties.

[ ]

e.

That the [ ] Plaintiff [ ]Defendant be awarded the home

Q£ Ver. 12-17-95
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and r e a l property as

[ ] P l a i n t i f f ' s [ ]Defendant's s o l e and

e x c l u s i v e property.

[ ]

e.

That the [ ] P l a i n t i f f £k] Defendant should be awarded the

exclusive use and possession of the p a r t i e s ' home u n t i l t h e
occurrence of the f i r s t of the fallowing conditions:

i.

The youngest child of the p a r t i e s r e a c h e s
eighteen (18) years of age, m a r r i e s , o r
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/

ii.

The p a r t y remarries;

i i i . The p a r t y ceases to use the home as t h e
primary residence;
iv.

The p a r t y cohabits with a n o n - r e l a t i v e
adult of the opposite sex in the home.

[

1

f.

Upor

.'

«-

^ - ul

. . •- .:.'.iu

J)

iite

coiiL.o \. • v i c

e n u m e r a t e d a b o v e , t h e D e f e n d a n t s h o u l d r e c e i v e an a p p r o p r i a t e

share

of t h e e q u i t y e x i s t i n g a t t h e d a t e of t h e e n t r y of t h e D e c r e e of
D i v o r c e i n t h i s m a t t e r i n s a i d home as d e t e r m i n e d by a n
c o n d u c t e d by a m u t u a l l y a g r e e d upon a p p r a i s e r ,

and d e d u c t i n g

t h e a p p r a i s e d v a l u e t h e amount of a l l e n c u m b r a n c e s .
s h o u l d r e c e i v e a l l e q u i t y i n excess

of t h e

The

from

Plaintiff

Defendant's

a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s h a r e of e q u i t y i n s a i d home e x i s t i n g a t
t h e e n t r y of t h e D e c r e e i n t h i s

appraisal

t h e t i m e of

matter.

P r o v i s i o n s R e l a t i n g to Alimony
\Y\

10.

QC V e r .

That n e i t h e r p a r t y s h o u l d be awarded
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alimony.
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[ ] 10.

That the Plaintiff be awarded a sum of not less than

$ *—cf3 ~~ per month as alimony from Defendant.

[ ] 10.

That the Defendant be awarded a sum of not less than

%bSO*crO per month as alimony from Plaintiff,

[ ] 11.

That the Defendant has pension and/or profit sharing plans

or other retirement benefits through Defendant's place of
employment.

It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff receive

one-half (£) of all benefits accrued pursuant to such plans during
the marriage.

[ ] 12.

That the Plaintiff should be entitled to claim the

parties' minor children as a tax deduction.

[ ] 12.

That the Defendant ^^uJd ':e ^w'zlM'i

-c

ic.:«

parties' minor child as a tax deduction.

[ ] 13.

That the Defendant should be permanently restrained from

bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the
Plaintiff at Plaintiffs place of residence, employment or any other
place.

[ ] 14.

That each party should be ordered to assume his/her own

costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action.

[ ] 14.

That the Defendant be required to pay the Plaintiffs

Q C V e r . 12-17-95
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attorney's fees.

[ ] 15.

That the [ JPlaintiff [^Defendant be restored the use of

her former name,

fi&4\ (LOCK.

•

DATED this

On this
day of
, 19
, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment was mailed,
postage prepaid to

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
day of
I mailed a true
On this
19
and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment of
Law, postage prepaid, 10
^
and placed a true and correct copy of the same in the Attorney
General's box in the Clerk's Office of the
Judicial
District Court,

QC V e r .

12-17-95

Page

14 of

14

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Y 'L: V

Name:
Address:

C[. Qctsrtld^ \I^TCUM
Z3B JRN 6 PH 4 23

Phone:
.r\ _ .

IN THE

&d^

OF S d ^ x f e f e

"X. O^q^/^ J^rckL^

JUDICIAL DIST;
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

vs •

/^sixxl/i MaiA rB<h*<

*

Case No,
Defendant,

•
it

Judge

•

STATE OF UTAH, Dept of
Human Services
Intervenor.

it
it

[ ] The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on
before the Honorable

. The

Plaintiff appeared in person.

[ ] The above-entitled matter came on before the court on
Plaintiff's Affidavit for Entry of Divorce Decree in
accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administrations.

[ ] The Defendant was regularly served but failed to appear in
person or otherwise file responsive pleadings and the Court
therefore enters the Defendant's default

QC V e r .
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[ ] The Court issued an Order for Publication of Summons and said
Summons was published in the
a newspaper of general circulation in the above-entitled
county once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks from
to

inclusive.

The Clerk of Court

mailed a true and correct copy of the Summons and Complaint
to the Defendant at his last known address and duly executed
an Affidavit of Mailing certifying said mailing.

[ ] The Defendant appeared in person and was represented by

[ ] More than ninety days has passed since this matter was filed
with the Court or the parties have completed the Divorce
Education Course.

The Court, having heard sworn testimony of the Plaintiff, having
reviewed the file in this matter and being otherwise fully advised,
enters its

FINDINGS CF FACT

1.

The Plaintiff and/or the Defendant are bona fide residents

of S o ^ VgLK>

County of the state of Utah and have been for three

months immediately prior to the filing of this action.

2.

The parties resided in the marital relationship in the

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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State of Utah or the acts complained of by the Plaintiff were
committed by the Defendant in the State of Utah and therefore this
Court has long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to
U.C.A. 78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended).

3.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on J? / £3f 77,

in J^A^a^uria,

I $JUA ,

and are presently married.

The parties

separated on or about

4.

During the course of the marriage the parties have

experienced difficulties that cannot be reconciled that have
prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.

5.
to wit:

There have been 0 children born as issue of this marriage
U^£-~~

CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE
NAME

6.

DATE OF BIRTH

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

Pursuant to Rule 4-S01(b), Utah Cooe of Judicial

Administration, the Plaintiff states, upon information and belief,

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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that there are no proceedings for custody of the above-named minor
children filed or pending in the Juvenile Court.

7.

Utah is the home State of said minor children pursuant to

U.C.A. 78-45c-3(l)(a) (1953) as amended in that:

a.

Utah is the home state of the minor children
at the time of commencement of this proceeding
or it is in the best interest of the minor
children that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because the minor children in
addition to his parents or one of the
contestants have a significant connection with
this state and there is available in this state
substantial evidence concerning the minor
children's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships.

[ ]

b.

Said minor children have resided at the
following places and with the following
parties outside of Utah:

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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P*e-2>

Child's Name:
NAME & RELATION

DATE

ADDRESS

DATE

ADDRESS

DATE

ADDRESS

Child's Name:
NAME & RELATION

Child's Name:
NAME Sc RELATION

c.

The Plaintiff has not been a party, witness or
participated in any other capacity in any other
litigation concerning the custody of the
subject minor children in this State or any
other State.

[ ]

d.

The Plaintiff has no information of any custody
proceeding concerning the subject minor

QC V e r .
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Vb&s ru^afyoCu

children pending in a court of this or any
other State.

[ ] d.

The Plaintiff has information regarding
a custody proceeding concerning the subject
minor children pending in a court of this
or another state as described below:

[ ] e.

The Plaintiff does not know of any person, not
a party to these proceedings who has physical
custody of the subject minor children and who
claims to have custody or visitation rights
with respect to said children.

[ ] e.

The Plaintiff knows of a person, not a party to
these proceedings who has physical custody of
the subject minor children and who claims to
have custody or visitation rights with respect
to said children as described below:

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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Child Custody and Visitation
[ ]

8.

The [ ]Plaintiff

[ JDefendant- is a fit and proper person

to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor
children of the parties, subject to the [ JPlaintiffs

[

JDefendant1s right to visit with the children at reasonable times
and places,

[ ]

8.

It is fair and reasonable that both parents be awarded

the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the [
]Plaintiff

[ ]Defendant be awarded the primary physical custody of

the children, subject to the other party's right to visit with the
children at reasonable times and places-

[ ]

8.

It is fair and reasonable that each parent be awarded the

permanent care, custody, and control of the minor children as
specified below, subject to the non-custodial parent's right to
visit with the children at reasonable times and places.

[ ]

8.

It is fair and reasonable that both parties be awarded

the joint legal custody of the minor children, but that the primary
physical custody of the children be given to each parent as
specified below, subject to the non-custodial parent's right to
visit with the children at reasonable times and places.

QC Ver. 12-17-95
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1 CHILDREN BORN OF THIS MARRIAGE
NAME

[ ]

9.

1
CUSTODIAN

The Plaintiff is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed

but is capable of working at a job which would pay $

per hour

based upon Plaintiff's work experience during the period of the
parties' marriage and income should be attributed to the Plaintiff
in the amount of S

[ ]

9.

The Plaintiff is employed at

earns $

per hour, works $

grosses $

[ ]

9.

per month.

,
hours per week and therefore

per month.

The Plaintiff is not employed and receives

per

month unemployment, social security (or other countable public
benefits as defined in 75-45-7.5 (1)) and receives $

per

month AFDC (or other non-countable public benefits as defined in
75-45-7.5 (3)).

[^J

10.

The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed
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apfa

Pt&& tut *ft>fy
but is capable of working at a job which pay $

per hour based

upon Defendant's work experience during the period of the parties'
marriage and income should be attributed to the Defendant in the
amount of %

[ ] 10.

per month.

The Defendant is not employed and receives $

per

mo nth unemployment, social security (or other countable public
benefits as defined in 75-45-7.5 (1)) and receives $

per

month AFDC (or other non-countable public benefits as defined in
75-45-7.5 (3)).

[ ] 10.,
earns $

The Defendant is employed at
per hour, works

grosses3 %/^WDJD£>
k/HJX

[ ] 10.

Attest~

hours per week and therefore

per month.

The Defendant's workplace is unknown, but Plaintiff

estimates Defendant earns $

per hour, works

week, and therefore grosses $
11.

S(di-(3mJ^ed^

hours per

per month.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) it is

iccboiiable ana proper unat nhe

[ jPlamtiff [ jDefendant

ordered to pay to the [ ]Plaintiff [ jDefendant

be

as and for child

support:

a.

A sum of not less than $

per month as base

support for the minor children of the parties, pursuant to the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said children become 18 years
of age, or have graduated from high school during the children's
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later.
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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b.

The base child support award should be reduced by 50%

for each minor child for time periods during which such minor child
is with the non-custodial parent by order for at least 25 of any 30
consecutive days.

If the dependent child is a recipient of Aid to

Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for
reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be
approved by the Office of Recovery Services.

However, normal

visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be
considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement.

c.

The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to

mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to U.C.A. 62A-11 parts
4 and 5 (1953 as amended), and any Federal and State tax refunds or
rebates due the Defendant may be intercepted by the State of Utah
and applied to existing child support arrearages.

This income

withholding procedure should apply to existing and future payors.
All withheld income should be submitted to the Office of Recovery
Services until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child
support to tne Plaintiff.

d.

The issue of child support arrearages may be determined

by further judicial or administrative process.

e.

r?r-u „c

tjie

p ( l r -_ e s sncula be unaer mutual obligation to

notify the other within ten (10) days of any cnange in monthly
Liiccn

e.
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£^5 Jufaffty
12,

Pursuant to U.C.A, 78-45-7.15 (1953) as amended, it is

reasonable and proper that:

a.

Both parties should be required to maintain insurance

for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children where
available at reasonable cost.

b.

Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs

of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion
of the insurance.

^c.

Both parties should share equally all reasonable and

necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and
co-payments, incurred for the minor children and actually paid by
the parties.

d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide

written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to
the other parent within 30 days of payment.

e.

A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the

right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with
the Subparagraph "d" above.

13.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended) both

parties should share equally the reasonable work-related or career
or occupational training for child care expenses of the custodial
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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parent.

a.

The non-custodial parent shall begin paying his or her

share of child care expenses on a monthly basis immediately upon
presentation of proof of the child care expense.

b.

The parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide

written verification of the cost and identity of a child care
provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider
and thereafter on the request of the other parent.

The parent shall

notify the other parent of any change of a child care provider or
the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the
date of the change.

A parent incurring child care expenses may be

denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover
the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the
expenses fails to comply with these provisions.

[ ] 14.

The parties have no outstanding debts or obligations.

[ ] 14.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired certain debts and obligations.
" u ~"

u
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a.

The Plaintiff:
Amount

II O b l i g a t i o n

/fW^/S^Ti UuAiJtet/4rme ^xLge.
1 (5^^M'S<rK LkileM 4tt>0,
J

*

^T*^o|

$

357-^1

$

I fWrvurn s {J-JMJIT1

*>• ^eek.

j

<2Stf-£>d

$

7%5.oA
* /£7. c£ 1
$

5

^ f - ^O

1

$
b.

I

The Defendant:
Amount

Obligation

ItMuA. OVL /titL^C

1 pyyj*X~ <m_

V, Odd -<r0

LOUL^L

$

ISTO.60

%

L<W,&1)

$
%
$

$

1

$
$

c.

||

All remaining debts and obligations should be the

responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt.

[ ] 15.

During the course of the marriage relationship, the

parties have acquired certain items of personal property.

Said

personal property cf the parties should be distributea as follows:
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To t h e P l a i n t i f f ;

Hri/Ui Lh3jf(Br-J

7'PUTTSt? S

jrff^^% heme +- p^rb^UA

irhu-eA.

b.

To t h e Defendant:

c.

All remaining personal property should be awarded to

each of the parties as they have heretofore divided it.

[ ] 16.

The parties acquired no real property during the course of

this marriage, nor QO \_hey presently own an interest in real
property.

[)/] 16.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired

certain real property to wit:

[ ]

a.

A home located at:
•f

more particularly described by the following legal
description:
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[ ]

b.

The Plaintiff alleges that such property should be sold

as soon as reasonably practicable and the proceeds of the sale
applied as follows:
i.

First, to pay expenses of sale;

ii.

Second, to retire any and all
mortgages and liens;

iii. Third, to pay all marital debts
and obligations;
iv.

Last, the balance remaining
thereafter to be divided equally
between the parties.

[ ]

b.

It is fair and reasonable that the [ JPlaintiff

jV] Defendant be awarded the home and real property as
[ JPlaintifffs [ jDefendanfs sole and exclusive property.

[ ]

b.

The [ JPlaintiff [>"]Defendant should be awarded the

exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the
occurrence of the first of the following conditions:

i.

The youngest child of the parties reaches
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/

ii.

The party remarries;

iii. The party ceases to use the home as the
primary residence;
iv.
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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Page 15 of 20

FINDINGS OF FACT

adult of the opposite sex in the home.

[ ]

c.

Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions

enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share
of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce in this matter in said home as determined by an appraisal
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from
the appraised value the amount of all encumbrances. The Plaintiff
should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of
the entry of the Decree in this matter.

[ ]

d.

A home located at:

more particularly described by the following legal
description:

7„„<Jr 47. <P/dJ-"A"i MMm dry ^dxjuer. S*y*fe; <**.

Lfj.

PC]

e.

The Plaintiff alleges that such property should be sold

as soon as reasonably practicable and the proceeds of the sale
applied as follows:
i.

First, to pay expenses of sale;

ii.

Second, to retire any and all
mortgages and liens;

iii. Third, to pay all marital debts
and obligations;
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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iv.

Last, the balance remaining
thereafter to be divided equally
between the parties.

[ ]

e.

It is fair and reasonable that the [ JPlaintiff

[ ]Defendant be awarded the home and real property as
[ ]Plaintiff's [ ]Defendant's sole and exclusive property.

[ ]

e.

The [ ]Plaintiff [ ]Defendant should be awarded the

exclusive use and possession of the parties' home until the
occurrence of the first of the following conditions:

i.

The youngest child of the parties reaches
eighteen (18) years of age, marries, or
otherwise becomes emancipated; or/

ii.

The party remarries;

iii. The party ceases to use the home as the
primary residence;
iv.

The party cohabits with a non-relative
adult of the opposite sex in the home.

[ ]

f.

Upon the occurrence of the first of the conditions

enumerated above, the Defendant should receive an appropriate share
of the equity existing at the date of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce in this matter in said home as determined by an appraisal
conducted by a mutually agreed upon appraiser, and deducting from
the appraised value the amount of alJ encumbrances.

The Pl?;.-^-" ' r

should receive all equity in excess of the Defendant's
aforementioned share of equity in said home existing at the time of
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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the entry of the Decree in this matter.

CSxl l"7-

[ ] 17.

Neither party should be awarded alimony-

It is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded a sum of

not less than $ _ _ ^ _ _ per month as alimony from Defendant.

[ ] 17.

It is reasonable that the Defendant be awarded a sum of

not less than %C£&*0T) per month as alimony from Plaintiff.

[)A 18.

The parties have acquired no interest in any pension or

profit sharing plan during the course of the marriage.

[ ] 18.

The Defendant has pension and/or profit sharing plans or

other retirement, benefits through Defendant's place of employment.
It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff receive one-half (£)
of all benefits accrued pursuant to such plans during the marriage.

[ ] 19.

The Plaintiff should be entitled to claim the parties'

minor children as a tax deduction.

[ ] 19.

The Defendant should be entitled to claim the parties1

minor child as a tax deduction.

[ ] 20-

The Defendant should be permanently restrained from

bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the
Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of residence, employment or any other
place.
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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[ ] 21.

Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own costs

and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action.

[ ] 21.

It has been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure the

services of an attorney to represent the Plaintiff in this action
and it is reasonable that the Defendant be required to pay the
Plaintiff's attorney's fees.

[ ] 22.

It is reasonable and proper that the [ ]Plaintiff

[^Defendant be restored the use of her former name,

H^(2^C
[ ] 23.

-

The Plaintiff has received public assistance from the

State, and has assigned the right to collect child support accrued
during the time public assistance was received to the State of Utah.
Therefore, pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 78-45-9, (1953), as
amended, the State of Utah should be joined as a party in interest
in the above-entitled action.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters
its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's
QC Ver. 12-17-95
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Findings of Fact, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of
Divorce, the same to become final upon entry herein-

The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been
resolved by the Court pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.

, »3£:.

DATED this

e l & M a b l / /_M / s £-> < ^ X ^ ^

On this
day
copy of the foregoing Findi
mailed, postage prepaid to

a t r u e and c o r r e c t
^and C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law was

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
day of
On t h i s
I mailed a true and
19
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, postage prepaid, to
and placed a true and correct copy of the same in the Attorney
General's box in the Clerk's Office of the
Juaicial
District Court.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT &AR - 6 2003
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and
CINDY STEWART,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 980600126
Judge David Mower

vs.
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS OF THE LAST DAYS,
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON,
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY
CRABTREE, KENT BRADDY,
PHILLIP P. SAVAGE, IVAN
DOUGLAS JORDAN, JOHN DOES
1-5,

Deposition of:
DOUG JORDAN
Reported by:
JILL RINGEL * CSR, RPR

ORIGINAL

Defendants.

The Deposition of DOUG JORDAN was taken on behalf
of the Defendants pursuant to Notice on 5/22/00 at the
hour of 1:10 p.m. at the Utah County Courthouse, 125
North 100 West, Provo, Utah.

REPORTING

SERVICES

INC

5 2 5 WELLS FARGO PLAZA
1 7 0 SOUTH MAIN STREET
S A L T LAKE CITY UTAH 8 4 1 0 1

(801) 3 2 8 1188 / 1 8 0 0 DEPOMAX
FAX 3 2 8 1 1 8 9

Deposition of:
1

DOUG JORDAN

financial bind?

2

A.

That f s right.

3

Q.

And he is the head of the TLC church?

4

A.

That's true.

5

Q.

And he didn't go to Andy Ericson?

6

A.

That's true.

7

Q.

Why is that?

8

A.

Because it had to do as a person in

9

need of money.

10

Q.

For his personal need?

11

A.

I don't know if it was for his personal

12
13
14

need or what he as going to do with it.
Q.

He didn't tell you what he needed the

money for?

15

A.

I didn't ask.

16

Q.

So when people came to you, you didn't

17
18
19

ask what they needed it for?
A.

No, I had already known that they were

going to ask.

20

Q.

But not what for?

21

A.

I never asked.

They told me if they

22

wanted to.

23

what was involved and what was given to me, I

24

wouldn't participate.

25

If they didn't and it didn't line up with

So if Jim came down and asked me for
110
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Deposition of:

DOUG JORDAN

1

money, I would have to think about it.

2

about it.

3

needed.

4

that's what I was told.

I did pray

And I was told to give him double what he

And not to put a feather in my hat, but

5

Q.

So if it's not a feather in your hat,

6

it's doing your duty; isn't it?

7

to give that money to him?

Wasn't it your duty

8

A.

My duty to God.

9

Q.

Yeah.

11

A.

Well, I had the money and I gave it.

12

Q.

You had a big chunk of money that Jim

10

That's what a stewardship is;

isn't it?

13

had handed you this check back that you consecrated

14

and you were to use it for doing things as directed

15

by the spirit?

16

A.

Yeah, because you got the direction.

17

Q.

And one of the things the spirit

18

directed you to do was give a chunk of it back to Jim

19

on this occasion when he asked for it?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

And a lot of people came to you and

22

said, We understand you have got money.

23

some?

24

said no?

25

Can we have

And sometimes you said yes and sometimes you

A.

That's true.

Ill
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Deposition of:
1
2

Q.

DOUG JORDAN

That was your stewardship, to sort that

out and decide?

3

A.

Well, if you want to classify that, the

4

money was handed back to me and I could do with it

5

what I wanted to do with it.

6

Q.

What you wanted to do?

7

A.

What I wanted to do was bring forth

8

Zion.

9

things, then I would not be in good standing with

10

Now, if I did it gambling or if I did other

God, I would assume.

11

Whether or not you call it a

12

stewardship or what you call it, you know, there's so

13

many names that you could tag this to.

14

the mind to get tied up in little words.

15

It boggles

What I did was I had money.

I gave it.

16

It was May's money.

17

away no strings attached.

18

classify it as consecration or not, I don't.

19

It was also my money.

I gave it

Whether or not you

I classify it as God said, Okay, you go

20

ahead and do it.

21

I have always got in trouble.

22

understand me.

23

right-brainer, I can't express myself, but what I'm

24

saying here is the gospel truth.

25

And whenever I have not done that,
I know people don't

They think I'm cooky, I'm a

I don't want to be classified as a
112
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DOUG JORDAN

1

person giving away other peoplefs money when other --

2

when the person that it's their money gave it to me

3

to consecrate with.

4

I want to make that pertinent, that

5

people understand that I'm -- that I was doing it as

6

a head of a household.

7

that I thought would take place.

8

Q.

9

I was doing it for a cause

And you were committed to use all your

money of your family for that cause?

10

A.

11

Not all the money.

You know, we had to

eat and we had to pay bills and we had to do things.

12

Q.

All of the surplus money of your

14

A.

It was not squandered.

15

Q.

All the surplus money of your family

13

family?

16

for that cause?

17

A.

To bring forth Zion?

18

Q.

All that money that was returned to you

19

Oh, absolutely.

from the altar was for that purpose; wasn't it?

20

A.

To bring forth Zion.

21

of establishing a society that

22

beyond the society of today.

23

Q.

24

Okay.

A.

I

--

that was far

Now, tell us with hindsight,

were those good decisions?

25

WELS

To help the cause

Did they build the cause?

You know, that could be a trick
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Deposition of:

DOUG JORDAN

1

question.

2

I still think it was to help the cause.

3

At the time it was helping the cause.

Q.

4

Okay.

And

So with hindsight you still

think it built the cause?

5

A.

Uh-huh.

I think there's a cause beyond

6

the cause that I don't want to get involved with

7

because it will bother your mind of getting involved

8

with scripture and that type of -- it would be better

9

if we just put that to rest.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

--0O0--

12

FURTHER EXAMINATION

13

BY MR. HILTON:

14

Q.

15

Were you married to Kaziah May before

the Indianola property was sold?

16

A.

Before, yes.

17

Q.

Did you have a prenuptial agreement?

18

Prenuptial being an agreement before you got married

19

on how you would hold different property or different

20

assets in your marriage.

21

A.

No, we just played it by ear.

22

Q.

And was there any time where she

23

requested to do a postnuptial agreement, some kind of

24

agreement after you were married?

25

A.

That agreement on using the money?
114

I

JILL M. RINGEL * CSR, RPR
DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, LLC (801) 328-1188

Deposition of:
1

Q.

DOUG JORDAN

An agreement saying this was my

2

property I brought into the marriage.

3

it separate.

4
5
6
7

A.

No, she gave it to me.

Q.

But you never had a written agreement

where you sat down and spelled it out?
A.

No.

9

Q.

That's all.

11 I

I was on the

account.

8

10

I want to keep

(The Deposition concluded at 4:40 p.m.)
--0O0--

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
115
JILL M. RINGEL * CSR, RPR
DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, LLC {801J 328-1188

TabE

".ivSO^DER/JUDGMENT
ENT£RED AND MAILED
TO PARTIES ON-

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

APR - 4 2CJ3

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

DEPUTY CLERK
U S BANKRUPTCY COURT

CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:
PHILLIP P. SAVAGE,

Bankruptcy Number 00-32966 JAB

Debtor.

[Chapter 7]

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ESTIMATING CLAIMS 4 AND 7

Don S. Redd, Layton, Utah, appeared representing Kaziah May Hancock and Cindy Sue Stewart,
Claimants.
Budge W. Call and Kevin Bond, Salt Lake City. Utah, appeared representing Phillip P. Savage,
Debtor.

This seemingly innocuous estimation proceeding under 11 U.S.C. §502(c)(l) disguises
not only the unusual basis for the claims asserted against this solvent chapter 7 estate, but also
the heavy emotional toll exacted upon the parties by the underlying events. The claimants,
Kaziah May Hancock (Hancock) and Cindy Sue Stewart (Stewart) (collectively the Claimants)
filed unliquidated claims against the estate declaring kiLaw suit for fraud, breach of contract, etc."
as the basis for each of their respective claims (Claims). Phillip P. Savage (Savage), the Chapter
7 debtor, objects to the allowance of the Claims.
Notwithstanding the unusual factual setting for these Claims and stripped of their unique

origin, the resolution of the issues presented is quite straightforward. Based upon the evidence
presented, having made an independent review of applicable law, and having set for the rationale
of the decision below, the Court estimates both Claims at zero.
FACTS
Savage and the TLC
At the times the events occurred that gave rise to the disputed Claims, Savage was a
member of The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of The Last Days (TLC), a
fundamentalist religious organization located near Manti, Utah. James D. Harmston (Harmston)
was the President and Prophet of the TLC. Savage believed in Harmston's teachings and that
Harmston was God's spokesperson on earth. Savage originally occupied the governing position
of an Apostle in the TLC's Quorum of the Twelve. Savage later occupied the position of
Patriarch for the TLC as one charged with the responsibility for giving religious blessings to the
members of the church.
The TLC taught a religious doctrine entitled the Law of Consecration. This doctrine is
evidenced by a Revelation on Consecration dated 19 March 1996, a document in which
Harmston described a communication that he declares he had with the Lord. It states, in part,
And it shall come to pass, that the Bishop of my Church, after that he has received
the properties of My Church, that it cannot be taken from the Church, he shall
appoint every man a steward over his own property, or that which he has received,
inasmuch as is sufficient for himself and family.1
The Revelation on Consecration was signed by Harmston, as President of the TLC, and affirmed
by the members of the Quorum of the Twelve, including Savage. The document was not signed

1
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by any other member of the TLC or by the Claimants. Hancock testified that she was aware of
this teaching and that the Revelation itself was brought to church meetings, circulated among the
members and accepted as a revelation from God to Harmston.
The Law of Consecration was described differently by various witnesses. One witness
described it as everything a member is and all of the member's possessions belonged to God and
that TLC members were to covenant to make available all the member's time and talents to build
up the kingdom of God. The Law of Consecration was also described as a symbolic proceeding.
TLC members would draft a list of physical assets and personal talents that were being
committed to the TLC and then submit the list to members of the TLC Bishopric. The Bishopric
would, in turn, commit the assets back to the church member's possession as a steward for the
TLC. Others, including the Claimants, took a more literal view of the Law of Consecration.
They believed that their property would be physically, rather than symbolically, transferred to the
TLC. Thereafter, they would physically receive back property as their stewardship.
Hancock
Hancock owned real property in the Indianola, Utah area (Indianola Property) that she
acquired in the late 1980's and upon which she raised cattle and goats. She married Ivan Douglas
Jordan (Jordan) in 1991 and he moved to her Indianola Property. Jordan was a member of the
TLC. Hancock joined the TLC in 1993, adopted the TLC doctrine of plural marriage, and she
and Jordan eventually decided to move to Manti, Utah. Hancock proceeded to sell her Indianola
Property to effectuate the move, which sale was concluded in March of 1996.
Harmston taught Hancock that the Law of Consecration required that she was to put all
her belongings in the hands of the TLC through Jordan. It was Hancock's understanding that she
OpmU/90 wpd
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should deliver certain of the Indianola Property sale proceeds to Jordan to then be delivered to
the TLC. Jordan, described by all as a very caring and generous man, distributed upwards of
$250,000 of the Indianola Property sale proceeds to various entities and individuals, including
Harmston and the TLC. He also gave approximately $2,500 to Savage as a gift to be used to
remodel his home.
On approximately September 6, 1996. Savage, in his capacity as Patriarch, gave Hancock
a religious Patriarchal Blessing. This blessing led her to believe that she had a heightened
obligation to participate in the Law of Consecration. Hancock testified that she believed that
Savage, acting in his capacity as Patriarch and pronouncing a blessing upon her, was functioning
as the mouthpiece for God. As such, it was God making promises to her, not Savage. Savage
also testified that his statements to Hancock were statements of God, not his own statements.
Hancock testified that as a result of the blessing, she felt obligated to surrender her property to
Jordan for delivery to the TLC and that Savage "shamed" her in to doing so. The evidence
establishes that the liquidation of the Indianola Property took place several months prior to the
blessing. The evidence is unclear however, as to whether the transfers of the sale proceeds from
Hancock to Jordan, and then from Jordan to others including the TLC, occurred before or after
the blessing was given in September 1996.
At a meeting on a date uncertain between members of the Bishopric, Jordan, Hancock
and Jordan's other wives, Hancock believes she was promised a stewardship. She testified she
believed she was to receive 20 acres of real property upon which she could raise livestock and 20
shares of water as her stewardship in return for sun'endering the Indianola Property sale proceeds
to Jordan and the TLC. Others present at the meeting dispute Hancock's allegation that she was
Opin0390 wpd
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promised any real property. Savage was not present at the meeting.
Hancock introduced selected pages of Jordan's May 22, 2000, deposition in an effort to
establish that an agreement had been reached regarding Hancock's receipt of a stewardship.
Taken as a whole, this testimony is vague and inconclusive in establishing any agreement. It
does not establish specific terms or obligations, the parties to the conversations, the relative dates
or the specific subject matter. The testimony references various conversations, but it does not
establish any agreements.
Hancock eventually located 15 acres of real property she wished to have as her
stewardship upon which she and Jordan made a down payment in June of 1997. She believed
that members of the hierarchy of the TLC, including Savage, approved of the purchase of the 15
acres. No document between Hancock and the TLC or Savage exists that memorializes that
understanding. Hancock also asserts that she was promised that the TLC would make the
payments on the real property for her. It did not.
Eventually, Jordan was excommunicated from the TLC, and on August 25, 1997,
Hancock resigned her membership in the church. Jordan2 and Hancock were subsequently
divorced by a Decree dated January 6, 1998. The Decree does not set forth any claims held by
Hancock against Jordan or the TLC for the proceeds from the sale of the Indianola Property.
Hancock claims that she is emotionally devastated as a result of the alleged "abusive
conspiracy" to obtain her money and the TLC's refusal to provide her property for her
stewardship. She is genuinely fearful that she will suffer bodily harm at the hands of TLC
members for bringing this and other actions against the TLC to regain the Indianola Property
2
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sales proceeds.
Stewart
Stewart's introduction to the TLC is also premised upon a close family association. Her
claim is all the more difficult for her emotionally because of her strained relationship with
Savage. Stewart was adopted by Savage as a 12-year-old child who had already experienced a
painful and difficult childhood. Over the years, the relationship between Stewart and Savage
became uneasy. Savage testified that Stewart had "disowned him" as her father three times.
As an adult, and following a troubling divorce. Stewart was convinced by Savage to join
him in Manti, Utah so she could investigate Harmston, the TLC and its teachings. Yet, Stewart
testified that at the time she joined Savage in Manti, it was her desire to do everything she could
to please her father.
Stewart eventually chose to join the TLC. Stewart was convinced by Harmston to give
approximately $12,000 in proceeds from her 401 (k) retirement account to Harmston and the
TLC. The 401(k) was essentially the only asset Stewart owned. Stewart testified that she
believed the transfer of the $12,000 to the TLC was a loan, that the loan would eventually be
repaid by the TLC, and that the TLC would pay any tax penalties that arose as a result of the
early liquidation of her 401(k).
Harmston testified that the transfer was not a loan, although Harmston's overall testimonv
is not particularly credible. Stewart believes that Sa\ age "vouched" for Harmston, that
Harmston. not Savage, promised she would be repaid money lent to the TLC, and that the TLC
would take care of all her needs for the remainder of her life. Stewart admits that she save all her
funds to Harmston, not Savage. Stewart testified that Savage did not receive any direct benefit
Opin0390 wpd
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from the transaction, except to be proud of his daughter for having embraced the TLC and its
teachings. Like Hancock. Stewart appears genuinely fearful that bodily harm will befall her for
asserting her claims against Savage and the TLC.
This Proceeding
Savage filed this Chapter 7 case on November 8,2000. The trustee requested and the
Court fixed August 22, 2001, as a bar date for filing claims. Hancock filed claim number 4 for
$462,681.33 and Stewart filed claim number 7 for $32,839.84. Both claims were filed on April
12, 2002. The Claimants both represented by the same attorney and the Claims were signed on
the Claimants' behalf by their attorney. The description listed as the basis for each claim is the
same: "Law suit for fraud, breach of contract, etc." No supporting documentation is attached to
the Claims and there is no information presented on the face of either claim to identify the bona
fides of the lawsuit. Hancock's claim indicates that the purported debt upon which the claim is
based arose in "1993 through 1997." Stewart's claim fixes the dates that the purported debt
arose as "1995 through 1997." The Court looks to these facts to make an initial determination as
to the allowability of the Claims.
DISCUSSION
/.

Procedural Posture of the Case
Savage filed objections to claims number 4 and 7 asserting the Claims were not timely

filed and that no liability existed. The Claimants responded, referencing certain related
proceedings in state court as the underlying basis of their Claims. The Court determined that the
most efficient manner for dealing with these unliquidated Claims and avoiding undo delay in
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Page 7 of 19

revised4/4/03- 8 49 am

administering the estate was through an estimation proceeding.3 The scope of the evidentiary
hearing was further narrowed to make a preliminary determination of whether Savage was liable
to the Claimants prior to any determination of the estimated amount of any allowed claims.
Upon conclusion of the evidential hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
IL

Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof
The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and

157. Venue in this division is proper. This is a core proceeding as contemplated by 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A), (B) and (0), except to the extent precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
A properly filed proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity and
amount of the claim.4 Such a claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects.5 The
objecting party has the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the objection. Such
evidence must be of a probative force equal to that of the allegations contained in the proof of
claim. However, an objection raising only legal issues is sufficient. Once the objecting party has
reached this threshold, the creditor has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the validity and
amount of the claim.HI.

Timeliness
Savage objects to the Claims stating that they are untimely and should therefore be

disallowed. Fed. R .Bankr .P. 3002(cj(5) go\ems the filing of a Proof of Claim in these

11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
4

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f).

5

§ 502(a).

6

In re Gene\a Steel Co . 260 B R 5 1 " < 10th Cir. B.A.P. 2001).
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circumstances. It states that if notice of insufficient assets to pay a dividend was given to
creditors and thereafter the clerk of court gives notice that payment of a dividend appears
possible, creditors may file proofs of claim within 90 days after the mailing of the notice. That
date was fixed as August 22, 2001.
The Claims were filed April 11, 2002, at, the Claimants assert, the invitation of the
chapter 7 trustee who was having difficulty obtaining sufficient claims to deplete the liquidated
assets on hand in the estate. Section 502(b)(9) of Title 11 provides that an untimely filed claim
may be disallowed, except to the extent tardily filed as permitted under paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of § 726(a).7 Since no distribution has been made in this case, and the case appears to be able to
satisfy all timely filed claims, there is no basis for disallowing the claims, only for subordinating
payment as set forth in the Code.8
Therefore, as properly filed Claims, they constitute prima facie evidence of the validity
and amount of the Claims and are deemed allowed subject to the objection of a party in interest.
In this case. Savage has objected and presented sufficient legal argument, in light of the
unliquidated nature of the claims and the lack of any supporting documentation to state the basis
of the claims, that the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the Claims has shifted
to the Claimants.

§ 502(b)(9).
*
Drew v. Royal (In re Drew). 256 B.R. 799, 804 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2001) (§ 502(b)(9) indicates that
tardily-filed claims are to be allowed if they are covered by § 726(a)(3). In a chapter 7 case, claims tardily filed by
creditors who had notice of the bankruptcy case are covered by § 726(a)(3), which indicates that such claims are
penalized b> being subordinated to timely-filed ones, but are still to be paid before any surplus is distributed to the
debtor).
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IV

The Parties' Positions
In their response to Savage's claim objection, the Claimants eventually submitted a copy

of the amended state court complaint filed in the 6lh Judicial Court in and for Sanpete County,
State of Utah, case no. 980600126. This appears to be the missing complaint which names
Savage as a party but against whom no judgment was ever entered because of Savage's
bankruptcy filing, and the Claimants' joint pleadings admit that there is no judgment against
Savage from the state court action.
The Claimant's response incorporates the state court complaint which sets forth five basis
for the Claims: (1) breach of a parole contract between the claimants, Savage and the TLC; (2)
fraud by Savage founded upon promises of Savage and his religious colleagues which wrongfully
induced the claimants to give them money: (3) that Savage was unjustly enriched via his
religious organization and the funds TLC received from the Claimants; (4) the activities engaged
in by Savage and his TLC colleagues constitute a racketeering enterprise under Utah Code
Annotated §76-10-1601 et seq.; and (5) Savage intentionally inflicted emotional harm on each of
the Claimants.9
Having now conducted the evidentiary hearing, it appears that the specific facts related to

9

Claimants also seek a ruling of non-dischargeability in the final sentences of their trial brief and in oral
argument. Such a request must be brought as an adversary proceeding within time limits set by the Bankruptcy Code.
The applicable time limits have long since expired. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4007(c) requires that a complaint under § 523(c) be
filed no later than 60 days after the first meeting of creditors. The my v. Yu (In re Themy), 6 F.3d 688.689 (10th Cir.
1993) (adopting strict interpretation of rule 4007 ( o sixty day time limit and binding creditor with actual notice of
bankruptcy time limit); Walker v. Wilde (In re Walker) 927 F.2d 1138. 1144-45 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 523 (c)
claims can not find refuge under § 523(a)(3j if creditors had actual knowledge of bankruptcy case in time to timely file
proof of claim and request determination of discharge). Although the trustee sought various extensions of time to file
a proceeding under § 727. the subsequent proceeding v. as dismissed with prejudice and Savage's discharge was issued
on May 16. 2001. Therefore, a ruling of non-dischargeability is procedurally improper and time barred. The Court
declines to rule on whether the Claims asserted b\ the Claimants are dischargeable and makes no finding as to whether
the Claimants received timely notice of this case. ;n the context of this claims estimation proceeding.
Opin0390.wpd
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Hancock which give rise to her claim are premised upon her failure to receive a stewardship of
land that she believes she was promised. As to Stewart, her claim is that the 401(k) funds given
to Harmsron were a loan that has not been repaid.
Savage responds that the state court law suit provides no basis for the Claims because (1)
he was not subject to the state court judgment, (2) the actual state court judgement was not
attached to the Claims as filed and that such a failure is fatal to the validity of the Claims, (3) the
referenced law suit and accompanying judgment does not include Savage, and (4) the Claimants
have no legal basis upon which to file a claim. More to the substance of the matter, Savage
argues that he did not commit any fraud or breach any contract with the Claimants. Savage
asserts he could not have breached any contract or committed any fraud relative to the Claimants
because he did not receive any money from the Claimants, did not enter into any contracts with
them and did not make any representations to them. Savage also argues that any assertion by
Hancock that she was entitled to a stewardship of land is void under the statute of frauds.
Further, Savage asserts that this Court may not meddle in matters based on the parties' religious
beliefs because any such ruling would necessarily implicate an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion thus implicating the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Finally, Savage argues that if a claim existed in Hancock's favor, it was against
Jordan, not Savage, and any such claims against Jordan were resolved in the subsequent divorce
proceeding.
V.

Core Matters and the First Amendment
The Court has previously ruled that this is a core proceeding as contemplated by 28

U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). (B) and (0), except to the extent precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
OpmU300upd

Page 11 of 19

revised4/4/03- 8*49 am

Section 157(b)(5) prevents this Court from trying personal injury tort claims. Therefore, to the
extent that the Claims assert a debt owed by Savage as a result of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress while acting in his ecclesiastical role with the TLC, those tort claims cannot be
adjudicated in this forum. Indeed, it appears that they cannot be adjudicated elsewhere if
premised upon a state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, for "it is well settled
that civil tort claims against clerics that require the courts to review and interpret church law,
policies, or practices in the determination of the claims are barred by the First Amendment under
the entanglement doctrine."10
VI.

Breach of Contract
The Claimants assert that they were promised a stewardship under the TLC Law of

Consecration and that this promise constitutes a binding contract between them and Savage.
This assertion is unavailing. "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral
features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract."11 The evidence indicates
that there was no meeting of the minds between Savage and either Claimant.
As to Hancock, if the meeting between members of the Bishopric, Jordan, Hancock and
Jordan's other wives, forms the basis of Hancock's contract claim, others present at the meeting,
including members of the TLC, dispute that an agreement was reached that she would be
supplied land. Even if such an agreement was reached, it would have been between the TLC and
Hancock, and not Savage and Hancock. Indeed, as to Hancock's claim, there was no evidence

10

Franco v. The Church of Jesus Chris: ofLancr-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 203 (Utah 2001) and cases

cited therein.
11

Richard Barron Ent. Inc.. v. Tsem. 92S P.2d 36S. 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pingree v. Cont'l Group
of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317. 1321 (Utah 1976))
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admitted at the hearing which established that Hancock and Savage had a meeting of the minds
relative to any obligations which Savage individually owed to Hancock. The only direct payment
received by Savage came from Jordan, Hancock's husband, in the form of the $2,500 gift. There
is no evidence that there was any agreement between Hancock, Jordan and Savage that those
funds should be repaid to Hancock. To the contrary, from the uncontroverted testimony, Jordan
was a generous man who regularly shared his wealth with others.
Similarly as to Hancock, and even though there is conflicting evidence as to whether her
401(k) transfer was a consecration or a loan, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that
Stewart and Savage had a meeting of the minds relative to any obligation Savage had to repay
Stewart the 401(k) funds. Assuming that indeed Savage "vouched" for Harmston, such an
endorsement from a believing father to his obedient adult child is insufficient at law to make
Savage a party to any contract which may have existed between Stewart and Harmston, or
Stewart and the TLC. There is no evidence establishing that Savage was present at the time
Stewart and Harmston agreed that Stewart would make the transfer of her 401(k) assets. Nor is
there any documentation establishing anyrightsor obligations between the parties. While
Stewart may have been trying to please her father when she delivered the funds to Harmston,
such action does not make Savage liable for repayment of the funds to Stewart.
Further, "[w]hen there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such
vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged
promise is said to be Illusory"".12 Assume for the moment that Savage, because he was once a
member of the Quorum of the Twelve, was somehow authorized to enter into a contract with the
!2
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Claimants on behalf of the TLC. Also assume that the basis of the promise to the Claimants
regarding their stewardship was the Revelation on Consecration. Even with these assumptions,
the contract argument nevertheless fails because the Revelation on Consecration is vague and
conditional. It does not specifically refer to either Hancock or Stewart. Nor does it set forth
what property may be the subject of the stewardship. It "neither binds the person making it, nor
functions as consideration for a return promise/'13 It is simply a statement of religious doctrine
and cannot be found to be an offer that would be contractually binding.
Finally, if the crux of Hancock's contract claim is that the TLC failed in its promise to
make payments on Hancock's 15 acres, the claim also fails as a matter of law because it violates
several aspects of the statute of fraud. If the TLC was to be the purchaser of the 15 acres, no
document exists to support that critical fact, and without documentation, any such contract must
fail.14 If Hancock asserts that the agreement was that the TLC would answer for the debt
incurred by Hancock and Jordan, it would likewise be unenforceable.15 Had there been such an
agreement, it likely would have taken longer than a year to perform, and without a writing to
support the promise, would be unenforceable.16

14

UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-1(2002) (No interest in real property, other than a lease for less than a year,
may be created unless conveyed in writing subscribed b> the party creating the same); Smngle v. Ernst Home Or., Inc.,
948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (accord).
15

UTAH

CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (2) (an agreement is void unless in writing if it promises to answer for the

debt of another).
16

UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (1) iE\ery agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement must be in writing).
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VII.

Fraud
The more interesting argument made by the Claimants is that they were defrauded out of

their funds. To establish fraud, the Claimants must prove the following by clear and convincing
evidence:
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to
base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage.17
These Claims, to the extent they assert fraud as a basis, are not impacted by the First
Amendment.18 While a compelling case might be made in a different forum to establish that the
Claimants may have been deceived by someone affiliated with the TLC, or may have been
intimidated with threats of serious bodily harm and as a result parted with their funds, such a
compelling case has not been made here.against Savage.
Hancock asserts that Savage gave her a Patriarchal Blessing, the contents of which
compelled her to deliver the Indianola Property sale proceeds to Jordan, with Jordan having the
responsibility under TLC doctrine to then deliver the same to the TLC. However, the Patriarchal
Blessing did not cause Hancock to liquidate the Indianola Property in the first place. The
liquidation predated the Patriarchal Blessing given to Hancock. Therefore, in order to make a
case for fraud. Hancock would have to prove that the representations made to her by Savage in

1

'
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124.126 (Utah 1982) (quoting Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d
273. 274-75 (Utah 1952)).
18
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the Patriarchal Blessing concerned a presently existing material fact that was false, that Savage
knew of the falsity or made the statements recklessly in order to induce Hancock to part with her
money, and that she acted reasonably and in reliance upon those statements to her injury. In
addition, she must prove this by clear and convincing evidence.
This Court cannot find that Savage knew the statements he made in the Patriarchal
Blessing were false at the time made. And, it is impossible to prove that they are, in fact, false.
More to the point, it is difficult to conclude that it was those statements that induced Hancock to
surrender her assets to Jordan. At the time she liquidated the Indianola Property and at the time
she consecrated her funds to Jordan and then to others including the TLC, Hancock apparently
truly believed in the teachings of Harmston and the TLC. Although she may have felt an added
responsibility or urgency to surrender her funds as a result of the Patriarchal Blessing, it is
impossible to separate her actions that were motivated by her religious convictions from her
reliance upon the statements in the Patriarchal Blessing.
Stewart has not presented any clear and convincing evidence that Savage defrauded her of
the funds in her 401(k). Since "vouching" for Harmston is the evidentiary link between Savage
and Harmston's or the TLC's acquisition of Stewart's funds, Stewart must prove that Savage
knew at the time he urged Stewart to transfer the funds that Harmston was not trustworthy or
reliable, or further, that he was not worthy of the religious devotion that Savage placed in him.
Although Stewart may now disbelieve Harmston's credentials, and indeed may have good reason
to, there is no evidence that Savase held such disbelief relative to Harmston at the time Stewart
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parted with her funds. Further, it appears that much, if not all, of Stewart's motivation was to
prove herself to be "the golden child," a devoted daughter to Stewart, rather than by placing an
objective reliance upon Savage's opinion of Harmston. Therefore, Stewart has failed to carry her
burden to prove fraud.
Both Claimants assert that they have received threats of physical harm by persons
associated with the TLC; presumably resulting from Claimants' attempts to retrieve their funds.
The Court has no doubt that the Claimants fears are real and substantial, and may, in fact, be
based upon threats received from individuals that may be connected with the TLC. However,
those threats would only be relevant to this proceeding in two ways: (1) if the threats of physical
harm induced the Claimants to surrender their funds, and (2) if Savage made the threats or caused
them to be made. Neither scenario has been alleged or proved.19
CONCLUSION
This ruling will seem harsh to the Claimants for they have lost both their money and their
once devoutly held religious convictions. Sometimes the law can remedy the first - it can seldom
remedy the second. The Claimants have simply failed to muster sufficient evidence to prove
their claims against Savage. Whether the Claimants have a cause of action against Harmston, the
TLC or others is not within the province of this Court. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, that claim number 4 is estimated at zero, and it is further

The Claimants assert that their Claims also arise under the civil penalty provisions of the Utah Pattern
of Unlawful Activity Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605 (2002) apparently as itemized in the State Court Complaint.
The Complaint recites that Harmston is the person who has allegedly committed theft by deception, theft of services,
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, and communications fraud. The Court expresses no opinion regarding
these allegations against Harmston. the TLC or others associated therewith besides Savage. Section 76-10-1605(1)
requires that the plaintiff be injured by the person who is engaged in conduct forbidden by the statute. The Claimants
have failed, as set forth above, to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Savage engaged in such conduct.
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ORDERED, that claim number 7 is estimated at zero.
DATED this *L day of April, 2003.

JUDITH A. BOUEDEN
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ESTIMATING CLAIMS 4 AND 7 upon the following at the address set forth below, postage
prepaid, by depositing the same in the United States Mail on the y th day of April, 2003.
Don S. Redd
44 North Main
Layton, UT 84041
Attorney for Kazaih May Hancock and Cindy Stewart, Claimants
Budge W. Call
311 South State , Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Phillip P. Savage, Debtor
Stephen W. Rupp
McKay, Burton & Thurman
10 E. South Temple, # 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84133

Law Clerk
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135

KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and CINDY
STEWART,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

1

DECISION IN REGARDS TO
MOTION TO DISMISS

1

Case No. 980600126

1

Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER

THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST
DAYS, JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, DANIEL
(DAN) SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE,
KENT BRADDY, JEFF HANKS, BART
MUSTROM, JOHN HARPER and JOHN
DOES NOS. 1-5,
j
Defendants.

,

A portion of this case is presently at issue and ready for a decision. The issue is raised by
the combination of the Amended Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss.
The Amended Complaint was filed on March 10, 1999. The Motion to Dismiss was filed
on March 14, 2003 by Attorney Kevin Bond on behalf of the defendants represented by him.
INTRODUCTION
The analytical method to be used is this: Assume that the complaint is true and then
analyze its claims to see if any are deficient.

DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 980600126, Page -2ANALYSIS
The Amended Complaint contains five separate claims or causes of action. I intend to
analyze each one separately.
Part One - First Cause of Action
"BREACH OF CONTRACT-ALL DEFENDANTS." The analytical method I prefer to
use is to search for the verbs in the language of the document. This helps me focus in on the
most relevant language of the claim. This method has led me to the following language which is
quoted directly from paragraphs 9, 11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint. I believe that this
language is the essence of the claim in the first cause of action.
Plaintiffs were ... promised by the [defendants] that they would
receive ... a "stewardship" of property or support... .
Plaintiffs did deliver money, goods, and services ... .
Plaintiffs never received a "stewardship ...."
There are two types of defendants in this case, individuals and organizations. Two
organizations are referred to by name in the Amended Complaint. One of those is "The True and
Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days." The other is "The Church of the
Firstborn."
The Amended Complaint contains several instances of words in quotation marks. I will
list them here.
"the TLC"

DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 980600126, Page -3"Bishopric"
"stewardship"
"consecrate"
"consecrated"
Sometimes an author uses quotation marks to signify words with special or unique
meaning based on circumstances or relationships. That could certainly be true in this case.
However, the drafter of the Amended Complaint has not explained the reason for placing certam
words in quotation marks. I will use the common dictionary definitions for these words.
Here are two of those definitions:
Stewardship
Pronunciation: 'stuu-&rd-l!ship, 'styiiu-; 'st(y)u(-&)rdFunction: noun
Date: 15th century
1 : the office, duties, and obligations of a steward
2 : the conducting, supervising, or managing of something;
especially : the careful and responsible management of something
entrusted to one's care stewardship of our natural resources>
Steward
Pronunciation: 'stiiu-&rd, 'styiiti-; !st(y)u(-&)rd
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English stlweard, from stl,
stig hall, sty + weard ward — more at STY, WARD
Date: before 12th century
1 : one employed in a large household or estate to manage
domestic concerns (as the supervision of servants, collection of
rents, and keeping of accounts)
2 : SHOP STEWARD
3 : a fiscal agent
4 a : an employee on a ship, airplane, bus, or train who manages
the provisioning of food and attends passengers b : one appointed

DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 980600126, Page -4to supervise the provision and distribution of food and drink in an
institution
5 : one who actively directs affairs : MANAGER
Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary (www.m-w.com)

Since a stewardship is a noun then it is a thing. One may wonder if the right to manage
someone else's property is a thing of value. However, the analysis here is not concerned with
value, only with whether or not a claim is stated. Here we have this claim: I was promised one
thing in exchange for another. I gave but didn't receive. I am entitled.
My conclusion is that a claim is stated.
Part Two - Second Cause of Action
"FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION - all
defendants."
Part 2,a, - Second Cause of Action - Fraud
The words "fraud" and "particularity" have become linked by the jurisprudence of our
state. For example, see P36 oi Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and
Others, 21 P.3d 200, Utah Supreme Court, 2001. I refer specifically to this sentence: "We have
stressed, and continue to hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude ... summary judgment."
As I read the text of this cause of action I looked for information about particular dates,
times, places, names of people, words that were spoken. I found none. Hence the cause of action
is deficient and should be dismissed.

DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 980600126, Page -5Part 2.b. Second Cause of Action - Constructive Fraud
Constructive Fraud must also be plead with particularity. The complaint is lacking in
particulars about times, places, names of people, words that were spoken. This cause of action is
deficient and should be dismissed.
Part 2.c. - Second Cause of Action - Neeligent Misrepresentation
This cause of action is plead as an alternative to Constructive Fraud. It should contain the
same specific information as the fraud claims. Since it does not it is deficient and should be
dismissed.
Part Three - Third Cause of Action
"FRAUDULENT CONVERSION or in the alternative UNJUST
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT-all Defendants."
The special words from this cause or action are:
Defendants have acquired ... money ... by fraudulent conversion
and/or [sic] unjust enrichment.
Defendants have breached an implied contract... by refusing to
provide ... valuable consideration, as promised in the full
amount....
... Defendants have been unjustly enriched.
This cause of action is essentially the same as the first cause since its resolution depends
on the value of a stewardship. The Third Cause of Action does state a claim and will not be
dismissed.

DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 980600126, Page -6Part Four - Fourth Cause of Action
"RACKETEERING - all Defendants."
Private, civil lawsuits are authorized for violation of Utah's Racketeering Enterprises Act.
The authorization is found in Section 76-10-1605(1), Utah Code.
The same statute requires that the elements of each claim be stated with particularity. See
Section 76-10-1605(7).
There is nothing in the fourth cause of action that refers to particular dates, times, places,
people, words or actions. Hence, this cause of action is deficient and should be dismissed.
Part Five - Fifth Cause of Action
"INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM - All Defendants."
A required element of this tort relates to intent. More specifically, the element relates to
the defendants' intent. The element is that the defendant"... intended to cause, or acted in
reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress ...." Retherfordv. AT&T
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 970-971 (Utah Supreme Court
1992).
The Complaint is silent as to this element. Hence it is deficient, and the cause of action
should be dismissed.
Mr. Bond is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by
following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504.
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IN THE SKTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STA-TE OF UTAH

KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and
CINDY STEWART,

)
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAfNTS OF THE LAST DAYS,
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON,
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY
CRABTREE. KENT BRADDY,
PHILLIP P. SAVAGE, JEFF HANKS and
JOHN DOES NOS. 1-5,
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Civil No. 980600126
Judge David L. Mower

Defendants.

The above entitled matter having been submitted for decision, the Court having
reviewed the Plaintiffs' memorandums and the Defendants' memorandums, and otherwise being
fully advised in the premises, hereby Orders, Adjudges, and Decrees as follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, Fraud/Constructive Fraud/Negligent

Misrepresentation is dismissed.

2.

The Plaintiffs* Fourth Cause of Action under the Utah's Racketeering

Enterprises Act is dismissed.
3.

The Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for intentional Infliction of Emotional

Harm is dismissed.
4.

The only actions remaining in the case are Plaintiffs" Breach of Contracc Claim

and Plaintiffs' Claim for Unjust Enrichment which are not dismissed.
r*

^ ^ ^

- '— -

"•-.

•„ -

*—>

,4,

-

c

A rS "-?„-*>

**- ~ ry "

BY THE COURT:

D'avidJk' xMower
District Court Judce

TabG

DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135

KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and CINDY
STEWART,

ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,

Case No. 980600126

vs.

Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER

THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST
DAYS, et al.,
Defendant.

The Plaintiffs have made a motion to file an amended complaint. It was accompanied by
a proposed pleading entitled Third Amended Complaint. There have been memoranda filed in
opposition to the motion, and it is now ripe and ready for decision.
DECISION
The motion should be denied.
ANALYSIS
The motion is not timely. Were it to be granted, it would require the fact finder to judge
church doctrine which is not allowed. Were it to be allowed, it alleges actions by Ivan Douglas
Jordan, who is not a party to this action, and complete relief could not be afforded. Mr. Call is
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311 S. State, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Clark R. Nielsen
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

William Lithgow

37550 Pine Knoll Ave.
Palm Desert, CA 92211

Keith Larson

524 W. Juniper
Snowflake, AZ 85937
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAI'JAH MAY HANCOCK, and
CINDY STEWART,

ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS
OF THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D.
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B.
LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON,
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY
CRABTREE, JEFF HANKS,
BART MUSTROM, JOHN HARPER
and JOHN DOES NOS. 1-5,

Civil No. 980600126
Judge David L. Mower

Defendants.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend, accompanied by a proposed Third
Amended Complaint, and with memoranda filed in opposition to the Motion, the Motion now being
ripe for decision; the Court having reviewed the memoranda and record on file, hereby rules as
follows:
1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion is denied.

2.

The Motion was not timely filed.

3.

For the Motion to be granted, it would require the fact finder to judge church

doctrine, which is not allowed.
4.

It alleges actions by Ivan Douglas Jordan, who is not a party to this action,

and complete relief could not be afforded.
DATED this

^

day of October, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

iU
David L. Mower
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

l<^z*f
Don S. Redd
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Don S. Redd
Attorney for Kaziah May Hancock
and Cindy Stewart
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Clark R. Nielson
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John H.Jacobs
JACOBS & EDDY, P.C.
Attorney for Kay Crabtree
75 North Center Street
American Fork, UT 84003
Kay Crabtree
P.O. Box 427
Babb, MT 59411
William Lithgow
37550 Pine Knoll Ave.
Palm Desert, CA 92211
Keith Larson
524 W. Juniper
Snowflake AR 85937
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